ABSTRACT An address block is defined as a set of continuous addresses between two points in an address space. Counting the number of distinct address blocks that have been accessed during a measurement period can provide useful information for cyber security, computer networks, and storage systems. However, this counting problem becomes challenging when addresses are accessed randomly since adjacent addresses must be carefully identified and merged into one block. This study presents a new algorithm that can accurately estimate the number of distinct address blocks where each address access is monitored only once. This new algorithm requires only three counters to keep the numbers of distinct addresses and one-bit truncated addresses, respectively, in two-tier counting architecture. Both time and space complexities are significantly improved because only three counters are required for cardinality estimation instead of traditional hash table or tree data structures. Experimental results show that the new scheme saves more than 50% memory space and runs two times faster than a tree-based existing algorithm; the relative error of estimation is less than 10%.
Counting the number of distinct address blocks provides important information about security and fault management. For example, port-scan attacks usually access most of IP addresses belonging to a victim because attackers usually test all or most of victim's IP address space to find every vulnerable system [1] . In this case, a large number of addresses are accessed, but the number of address blocks is relatively small. Therefore, comparing the number of destination addresses with the number of destination address blocks from a source address can reveal a port-scan attack. Recently, Baek et al. showed that counting the number of LBA blocks that have been read and written sequentially provides a critical hint for ransomware detection [3] . The big idea is that ransomware must replace original storage blocks with encrypted ones to prevent victims from recovering the original data, which increases the number of overwriting blocks. Therefore, counting the number of overwriting blocks can give critical hints on detecting ransomware infection.
If addresses are always accessed in order, the counting problem of distinct address blocks becomes easy to solve with only one counter. We assume that address access is monitored and a counter is initialized to zero. If the previously accessed address and the current one are not adjacent, the counter is simply increased by one. However, this problem becomes challenging if addresses are accessed randomly and out of order. This happens when an attacker sends scanning packets slowly, messing up the order deliberately to avoid detection. For storage systems, basic storage units are not always accessed in order; even parallel multi-processing can mix up the order of address accesses. In these cases, adjacent addresses belonging to a same address block must be identified first and merged into one because they belong to the same address block. Data structures, such as a tree or hash table, are required for this identification and merging process.
Streaming algorithms solve a range of counting problems, such as heavy hitters and heavy distinct hitters, also known as cardinality estimation, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Good streaming algorithms can accurately estimate real values, whereas every object, such as an address, is monitored only once. Since these algorithms can save both memory space and computation power by a large degree, they are popularly used in highspeed networking and large database systems.
In this paper, we present a new streaming algorithm to count the number of distinct address blocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first streaming algorithm that estimates the number of address blocks accurately using only three cardinality counters. The first cardinality counter counts the number of distinct addresses, the second counts the number of distinct addresses with the last bit of each address truncated, and the third counts the number of distinct addresses with the last bit of each address truncated after each address is increased by one. This new algorithm is referred to as address block counting with two-tier cardinality estimation (ABC2) because three cardinality counters are taken from two-tier representation of address values. We theoretically prove that these three counters are sufficient to accurately count the number of address blocks. When implemented with streaming algorithms for cardinality estimation, ABC2 significantly saves memory space and processing time. The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that defines a new counting problem, i.e., address block counting. Solving the problem is useful for a range of data-analysis, computing and communication areas.
• We present the method to solve the address block counting problem with two-tier cardinality counters. We prove that three cardinality counters are sufficient to solve the address block counting problem for the first time.
• Our new algorithm can significantly save memory space and processing time when implemented with any streaming algorithm for cardinality estimation. We stress that our algorithm can be combined with any existing estimators, such as linear counting [4] or HyperLogLog [5] , [6] .
• Experimental results show that our algorithm with bitmap-based implementation of [4] can save more than 50% memory space and runs two times faster compared FIGURE 1. An ordered list for address block counting when t = 4. Addresses are accessed randomly. In this example, they are accessed in the order of (6, 12, 1, 14, 9, 5, 13, 8) . There are four address blocks of [1:1] , [5:6] , [8:9] , and [12:14] , and the average block size is 2(=(1+2+2+3)/4). The ordered list can be implemented in a tree data-structure.
with a tree-based existing algorithm; the relative error of estimation is less than 10%. This new scheme reduces the time complexity from O(log(n)) to O(1) for one address access. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II defines the problem of address block counting. Section III describes ABC2 algorithm. Section IV presents experimental results, and section V discusses the related work. Section VI draws the conclusion.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MOTIVATION
We first define the problem of address block counting, and then provide an example where this problem matters for real applications.
An address space is defined as a set of addresses that are represented with t-bits. Without the loss of generality, we assume that the address space ranges from 0 to 2 t − 1. An address block is defined as a set of continuous addresses from a starting address to an ending address, which is denoted as [starting address:ending address].
We assume that an address is randomly accessed and each address access can be monitored in real time. We also assume that addresses can be accessed out of order from inter and intra address blocks. For example, Fig. 1 shows that addresses are accessed in the order of (6, 12, 1, 14, 9, 5, 13, 8) where t = 4. There are four address blocks: [1:1], [5:6] , [8:9] , and [12:14] ; the average block size is 2(=(1+2+2+3)/4).
We define the problem of an address block counting as follows: for an ordered list of address block accesses, we counts the number of address blocks and compute the average block size. Note that the average block size can be obtained by the number of distinct addresses accessed divided by the number of distinct address blocks. We observe that a range of streaming algorithms have been presented to count the number of distinct addresses [4] , [5] , [7] , [8] . Therefore, we focus on the problem of counting the number of distinct address blocks in this paper, which has not been studied enough, to the best of our knowledge.
A naive solution to the address block counting problem is shown in Fig. 1 . An ordered list is maintained to keep a track of adjacent addresses, which must be merged into one. This can be implemented as well-known data structures such as a tree or a hash table.
Herein, the problem of address block counting is studied. We present a new algorithm that measures the cardinalities of three address sets to obtain the exact number of distinct address blocks. Then, we show that this new algorithm can be orthogonally combined with any existing streaming algorithm for estimating set cardinality, which can significantly save memory space and processing time. This property enables our algorithm to be implemented inside small but high-speed SRAM or cache memory, which has significant advantages. For example, this enables line-speed packet processing in computer networks [7] and saves expensive computing resources within SSD for storage systems [3] , which are useful in a range of industry applications.
We provide an application example where address block counting is useful; address block counting can help detection of ransomware activities [3] , [9] , [10] . Recently, Baek et al. presented seminal work in detecting ransomware at storagelevel by monitoring low-level block I/O requests, which is named SSD-Insider [3] . The main idea is that ransomware activities essentially increases the number of overwriting blocks at any storage, and therefore counting the number of block overwriting requests gives a critical hint on ransomware detection. One problem is that some normal application activities such as database updates or data wiper are wrongly identified as ransomware because they also generate overwriting blocks. The authors of SSD-Insider distinguish these normal activities from ransomware by the different size of address blocks. The observation is that the address block size of ransomware is not as large as that of database or data wiper that in general writes a large number of continuous blocks. Note that recent ransomware targets at important files such as a document and a picture file that occupies a limited number of blocks. Therefore, solving the problem of address block counting directly helps ransomware detection, and the implementation should be done efficiently to be located inside SSD firmware. More details on address block counting and its application for ransomware detection are explained in [3] .
III. TWO-TIER COUNTING FOR DISTINCT ADDRESS BLOCKS
We present a new algorithm to count distinct address blocks, i.e., address block counting with two-tier cardinality estimators (ABC2). Two-tier counting is introduced and theoretically proved first. Then, bitmap-based implementation is presented, which can significantly save memory space and processing time.
A. TWO-TIER COUNTING ALGORITHM
We observe that the number of distinct address blocks can be estimated by counting distinct addresses and their transformed values with the last bit truncated. This new counting scheme can be visualized as two-tier architecture, as shown in Fig. 2 (a) . Tier-0 comprises original addresses, whereas tier-1 comprises transformed address values with the last bit truncated. Addresses are shown as binary numbers to help readers understanding. The numbers of distinct addresses in tier-0 and tier-1 become 8 and 6, respectively in Fig. 2 (a) . In this paper, we call these numbers as tier-0 counting and tier-1 counting, denoted as c 0 and c 1 , respectively. For example, c 0 = 8 and c 1 = 6 for Fig. 2 (a) .
Interestingly, the number of distinct blocks can be accurately estimated when tier-1 counting is doubled and then subtracted by tier-0 counting. For example, 2 × c 1 − c 0 = 2 and the number of address blocks is also 2 for Fig. 2 (a) . Herein, we explain why this property is valid. Let d be the number of distinct address blocks. Then,
We prove Approximation 1 for each of the two mutually exclusive cases: 1) when the size of an address block is odd and 2) when the size of an address block is even. For simplicity, we consider a case wherein only one address block is given. Extension to multiple blocks is straightforward.
First, suppose that the size of an address block is an odd number. This block increases c 0 and c 1 such that 2 × c 1 − c 0 = 1 is always true. For example, [0001:0001] increases both c 0 and c 1 by one, respectively, as in Fig. 2 (a) . Similarly, [1100:1110] increases c 0 by three, whereas c 1 increases by two. Therefore, we can count the exact number of address blocks whose size is odd by computing 2 × c 1 − c 0 .
Second, we consider an address block whose size is even. In this case, two different subcases must be considered separately, depending on the starting address. 1) the starting address of the block is an odd number. In this subcase, the address block affects c 0 and c 1 such that 2 × c 1 − c 0 = 2. This makes the counting larger than the real value by one. In Fig. 2 (a) , [0101:0110] is an example for this first subcase. Note that the real number of one address block must be counted as one. 2) the starting address is an even number. In this subcase, the counting result is smaller than the real value by one: 2 × c 1 − c 0 = 0. In Fig. 2 (a If there are sufficient number of address blocks, and the probability that an address block starts at an odd or even address is almost similar, then 2×c 1 −c 0 = 1 is valid. Hence, we can quite exactly estimate the number of address blocks whose size is even by computing 2 × c 1 − c 0 .
In conclusion, we can always exactly count the number of address blocks whose size is odd and can quite accurately estimate the number of address blocks whose size is even. Hence, Approximation 1 can be used for estimating d accurately.
However, when most address blocks of an even size starts at odd addresses, or even addresses with a non-negligible bias, Approximation 1 becomes inaccurate.
To solve the fundamental problem, we invent an exact counting algorithm. The idea is that we generate another tier-1 counter, c 1 , which can complement c 1 to correct potentially biased estimation. The new equation is as follows:
We explain how to compute c 1 and why Equation 2 holds. We define c 1 as the number of shifted addresses from the monitored addresses with the last bit truncated. For any monitored address, the shift process first increases the address by one and truncates the last bit. For example, address '0001' becomes '001' after the shift process finishes. Fig. 2 (a) becomes Fig. 2 (b) , which computes c 1 .
To prove the validity of Equation 2, we only need to handle an address block whose size is an even number because address blocks of any odd size can always be exactly counted as previously explained. Consider an address block of an even size. If this block starts from an even address, then 2 × c 1 − c 0 makes zero but 2 × c 1 − c 0 makes two. Therefore, c 1 + c 1 − c 0 makes one, which is the exact counting value for this one block. We can implement ABC2 using only three counters, namely c 0 , c 1 , and c 1 . Equation 2 generates the exact number of distinct address blocks. This two-tier counting algorithm is novel and efficient. Fig. 3 (a) shows a pseudo code for this algorithm. Each address access is monitored only once. Three sets are updated for each monitored address, and finally, three counter values are computed from the set sizes.
The average block size can be easily obtained by computing the number of distinct addresses divided by the number of distinct address blocks, which is c 0 c 1 +c 1 '−c 0 . Although ABC2 is simple and efficient, as shown in Fig. 3 (a) , a set is an inherently expensive data structure. Elements must be sorted for quick search and insert operations. The next section presents methods to implement ABC2 using streaming algorithms for cardinality estimation that can significantly reduce both time and space complexities simultaneously.
B. ABC2 IMPLEMENTATION USING STREAMING ALGORITHMS
A range of streaming algorithms have been presented to efficiently estimate a set size, also known as cardinality or spread value, with small time and space complexities [4] , [5] , [8] . We stress that ABC2 can be implemented using any of these streaming algorithms to estimate the three counters, c 0 , c 1 , and c 1 . Note that the perfect accuracy of ABC2 can be affected when a streaming algorithm is used as a counting module. Herein, we combine ABC2 with the linear counting algorithm [4] because of its simple but efficient structure. We stress that ABC2 can be orthogonally combined with any other cardinality estimation algorithms. Fig. 3 (b) shows a pseudo code when ABC2 is implemented via linear counting. Three bitmaps are maintained to estimate c 0 , c 1 , and c 1 , and each address is monitored once. The bitmaps are of the same size, m, for simplicity.
The linear counting can save a significant amount of memory space by using a small number of bits to encode an address, and it does not require implementation of any sorting process for a traditional tree-based set data structure. This space compactness enables ABC2 to reside in fast but expensive SRAM instead of DRAM, or similarly DRAM instead of hard disks, which is one of the main purposes by using streaming algorithms. If we implement ABC2 on hyperloglog [5] , [6] , a more compact streaming algorithm than linear counting, memory space can be further reduced by orders of magnitude. However, the estimation accuracy can be further deteriorated. Table 1 compares three counting schemes, namely treebased set, linear counting, and hyperloglog, which can be implemented as counting modules for ABC2. The time complexity is measured for one address access. Although the time complexity of (ABC2+set) seems similar to that of the naive scheme shown in Fig. 1 , the naive scheme also requires an extra merging process to check adjacent addresses and to combine them.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experimental results of ABC2. Two different versions of ABC2 were implemented, ABC2SET and ABC2LC, which adopted a set data-structure based on a tree and linear-time probabilistic counting [4] as counting modules, respectively. We also used a simple sorted list based on a tree data structure for comparison, denoted as TREE, which is described in Fig. 1 . All experimental codes were developed and run in Python 3 programming language on Windows 10 (64bits) with intel i7-8700 CPU and 16 GB RAM. The experimental results show that ABC2SET runs 1.5 times faster than TREE using less memory space while the perfect accuracy is preserved. The processing speed of ABC2LC is 2 times faster than TREE, and more than 50% memory space is saved compared with TREE; the relative error for estimation is within ±10%. These results are obtained with 1,000 distinct address blocks when the average block size is 55.
Data sets for experiments are generated with an address space of t = 128, following the IPv6 address space. We use multiple data sets for experiments. Each data set is generated to include n distinct address blocks. This data set is used repeatedly for ABC2SET, ABC2LC, and TREE for fair comparison. We change n from 1 to 1,000 to see how ABC2 works with different data sets. For given n, new address blocks are randomly generated until we have n distinct address blocks with no blocks overlapped with each other. The size of each address block is selected randomly from [10:100]; this makes the average length of address blocks 55, and hence, the average number of distinct addresses becomes 55 × n. Note that the number of distinct addresses is directly related with the size of memory space requirement. Figure 4 shows a summary of the experimental procedure. We generate 1,000 data sets while changing n from 1 to 1000. Then, three algorithms run on the same data sets for fair comparison. Both ABC2LC and ABC2SET are our proposed schemes while TREE is an existing method. Two performance metrics of processing time and estimation accuracy are used to compare three algorithms. Note that TREE and ABC2SET can exactly count the number of address blocks, but ABC2LC uses statistical estimation. Therefore, only ABC2LC causes estimation errors, but it runs faster and requires less computing resources than the others.
In the first set of experiments, we compare processing speed of TREE, ABC2SET, and ABC2LC. Fig. 5 shows how processing time in seconds increases with the number of address blocks, n. When n is at its maximum value of 1,000, the average number of addresses is expected to be 55 × 1, 000. For TREE implementation, each node requires at least 256 bits because 128 bits for one address and 128 bits for two pointers to connect a parent node to two child nodes. Therefore, at least 1,678 KB (= 256×55, 000 bits) is required for TREE. We set the size of a bitmap of ABC2LC, m, to 256 KB, irrespective of n. Therefore, ABC2LC requires only a total of 768 KB (= 3 × 256 bits) because it comprises three bitmaps. We will later show that ABC2LC performs well with this small memory space.
Because the processing time can vary with different software and hardware platforms or programming optimization skills, relative comparison is more apt than directly using the absolute processing times of y-value from Fig. 5 . In this figure, we confirm that both ABC2SET and ABC2LC outperform TREE. First, ABC2LC does not require any sorting or merging process. Second, only one hash function computation and memory access is required. Compared with TREE, ABC2SET does not require any merging process. Note that all set-based algorithms inherently include sorting that generally incurs multiple memory accesses via pointer operations. When n = 1, 000, ABC2LC runs 2 times faster than TREE and 1.5 times than ABC2SET. This performance gap will increase as n increases.
Linear counting, or any compact streaming algorithm, causes estimation errors; thus, the accuracy of ABC2LC must be analyzed. Fig. 6 shows the accuracy of ABC2LC with different m values in which x-axis is the real number of address blocks, n, and y-axis is the estimated number of address blocks, denoted asn. Hence, a perfect estimation generates a point over y = x. We change n from 10 to 1,000, and 10 different experimental data sets are generated for each n. We set m to 128 KB, 256 KB, and 512 KB, for the left, middle, and right plots of Fig. 6 , respectively. Estimation accuracy is improved with large m. We do not show experimental results of TREE and ABC2SET for accuracy comparison because they measure the exact number of distinct address blocks. However, they require large memory space. Note that at least 1,678 KB is required for TREE, as previously explained.
V. DISCUSSION
Experimental results show that ABC2LC outperforms traditional tree data structures in terms of processing speed as shown in Fig 5. We confirm that ABC2LC requires a constant number of memory accesses. Note that the experiments used only 55,000 distinct addresses for its largest data set. Therefore, the performance gap would be larger if more addresses are accessed.
From experimental results, we find out that the accuracy of ABC2LC is not as good as expected if we consider the high accuracy of a linear counting estimator from [4] . This is because ABC2LC adopts three linear counting modules as estimators for c 0 , c 1 , and c 1 , and derives the final estimated value by using Equation 2; we add c 1 to c 1 ', and subtract c 0 again, and therefore the variance becomes larger than that of one linear counting estimator as follows:
where covariances of any two random variables are positive values. This explains why ABC2LC cannot reduce as much bits as an original linear counting algorithm of [4] .
From the experimental results, the advantages and disadvantages of ABC2LC and ABC2SET are clearly confirmed. When an exact number of address blocks is required, ABC2SET should be used. We stress that ABC2SET runs 1.5 times faster and more than 50% memory space is saved, compared with the current state of the art, TREE. When a small estimation error is allowed for the number of address blocks, ABC2LC would be a better choice. As shown in Fig. 6 , the relative error of ABC2LC is less than 10%, but it runs faster and consumes less resources than ABC2SET as well as TREE.
VI. RELATED WORK
Ransomware stealthily encrypts the files on a user's machine and demands the user to pay a ransom for file recovery [3] , [9] , [10] . IT is almost impossible to recover infected computers without paying the ransom when ransomware is well designed. This is one of the most critical cyber attacks, and profitable business to attackers. For example, WannaCry ransomeware infected more than 230,000 computers across 150 countries in 2017 [9] .
Recent studies show that counting the number of block or page addresses that have been read and written inside SSDs can reveal the infection of ransomware at an early stage [3] , [9] . Baek et. al also showed that measuring the number of distinct address blocks and the average length of address blocks can distinguish real ransomware infection from normal disk management solutions [3] . Their implementation relied on a hash table to keep a track of adjacent addresses to combine them into one address block, which requires around dozens of megabytes to keep 10 seconds FIGURE 6. Estimation accuracy of ABC2LC with different m. From left to right, m is set to 128 KB, 256 KB, and 512 KB. x-axis is the number of address blocks, n, and y -axis is the estimated number of address blocks,n. Points on y = x represent perfect estimation. n varies from 10 to 1,000, and 10 independent experimental data sets are generated for each of n.
of measurement period. Actually, this related work directly motivates us to study the problem of address block counting.
As far as data recovery from ransomware is concerned, the unique property of SSD is helpful that delays overwrites; SSD temporarily keeps the blocks to be overwritten. Recent work propose that data are recovered from these temporary blocks [3] , and overwriting is only allowed when the target blocks are not overwritten by encrypted data [10] .
Cardinality estimation has been an active research topic in the past decades for database, network security, data streams, search engines, and online data mining. When there is sufficient memory space to store distinct elements, finding cardinality is easy. Research has focused on reducing memory and resource consumption while all data are read only once because such memory space is not always available. Harmouch et. al. compared twelve cardinality estimation algorithms theoretically and experimentally [8] . There are trade-offs among the algorithms. For example, linear counting [4] runs faster than hyperloglog [5] , but requires more memory space. We stress that our proposed scheme can work together with any of these streaming algorithms.
Port scanning attacks and their variants can be identified by counting the number of distinct destination addresses or port numbers contacted from a source address [1] , [11] , [12] . If the number becomes larger than a predefined threshold value, a detection alarm would be triggered. However, smart attackers can evade this simple security policy by resizing the set of target addresses contacted from a source address, called evasive scanning [1] . Address block counting can help the detection of evasive scanning by estimating the average size of continuous target addresses or port numbers contacted from a source address.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we defined the problem of address block counting and presented new algorithms to solve the problem. Address block counting is useful for detection of cyber attacks, especially port scanning and ransomware infection. We proposed two algorithms for address block counting; the first one counts exact number of address blocks, and the second one estimates the number with a small error. We proved that proposed schemes can solve the address block counting problem. Through experiments, we confirmed that both proposed schemes outperform an existing method in terms of memory space and processing time. The proposed scheme can be combined with any cardinality estimator such as a streaming algorithm, to significantly save memory space and processing time simultaneously. In this case, the estimation accuracy is a little lowered, but memory space and time can be further saved. Address block counting can be useful for distinguishing abnormal address block accesses from normal access patterns, especially in storage block accesses and network connections. YOUNG JAE KIM received the B.S. degree in computer engineering from Kookmin University, Seoul, South Korea, where he is currently pursuing the master's degree in computer engineering. His research interests include malware detection using machine learning, network algorithms, and information security. VOLUME 7, 2019 
